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ABSTRACT
Measurements — interactions which establish correlations between a system and a
recording device — can be made thermodynamically reversible. One might be concerned
that such reversibility will make the second law of thermodynamics vulnerable to the
designs of the demon of choice, a selective version of Maxwell’s demon. The strategy
of the demon of choice is to take advantage of rare fluctuations to extract useful work,
and to reversibly undo measurements which do not lead to such a favorable but unlikely
outcomes. I show that this threat does not arise as the demon of choice cannot operate
without recording (explicitely or implicitely) whether its measurement was a success (or
a failure). Thermodynamic cost associated with such a record cannot be, on the average,
made smaller than the gain of useful work derived from the fluctuations.
c©by Wojciech Hubert Zurek, March 12 1998
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When I was asked to write for a volume dedicated to Richard Feynman, I decided
that I should select the subject in which I was influenced by him the most, and which
would still be consistent with the overall theme of computation and physics. And these
influences started well before I met him in person: I got Feynman’s “Lectures on Physics”
more than a quarter century ago, in Polish translation, from my father. As a finishing
high school student I was accompanying him on a hunting expedition in the lake district
of Poland — a remote corner of the country. Every few days we drove for supplies to the
provincial capital, and there I noticed the volumes in the local bookstore. My father asked
why (the expense was considerable), but surprisingly easily gave way to my arguments.
I spent much of the rest of the hunting vacation (a couple of weeks altogether) getting
through volume I.
Over the years I have developed a habit of treating the “Lectures” sort of like a
collection of poems. I like some “poems” more than others, and I return to the favorites
now and again. And when I am stuck with a physics problem, reading a few of the relevant
“poems” is often the best way to get “unstuck”. But there are a few chapters which have
been read over and over again without any such an ulterior motive, for sheer pleasure.
Amongst them, I would certainly include the discussion of the fluctuations and the second
law (the famous “ratchet and pawl” argument1).
Thermodynamic concerns and arguments have often pre-saged the deepest develop-
ments in physics. I suspect this is because thermodynamics “knows” about the physical
relevance of information, and hence, it knew about the Planck constant, stimulated emis-
sion, black hole entropy, and so on. When I met Feynman in person for the first time (at a
small workshop organised near Austin, Texas, by John Archibald Wheeler in the Spring of
1981), I remember — amongst other things — a thermodynamic argument he used to great
effect to prove that one cannot accelerate elementary particles by shaking them together
with a bunch of heavier objects, so that they could acquire equipartition kinetic energies
(and therefore, because of their small mass, enormous momenta). This idea (credible at
first sight, as it is akin to the Fermi acceleration of cosmic rays) was brought up by one
of the participants. It would not work — Feynman argued — because all sorts of other
modes of the vacuum would have to get their fair share of energy, creating an equilibrium
heat bath, with approximate equipartition between all the modes (rather then with the
energy in the elementary particles one really wanted to accelerate in the first place).
But that was not the most vivid memory of that first encounter with the man whose
“Lectures” I had acquired a decade or so earlier. Rather, I remember best that he showed
up at the first lecture unshaved and uncombed, with dry grass in his hair. It turned
out that he spent the night outside — apparently, he decided the accomodations for the
speakers (which were in the posh tennis club) were too opulent, returned the key to his
apartment at the reception, and decided to “camp out”. During the morning coffee he has
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also reported in detail (and with great gusto) how he had trouble breaking the code to get
into his briefcase (where he had the sweater — it got cold). He knew the code, of course,
by heart, but it was middle of the night, so he somehow had to dial it in complete darkness.
He clearly relished the challenge. I do not remember how did he solve the problem, but
the flavor of the adventure and of his report was very much in the spirit of the “adventures
of a curious character”. And all of this was a few months after his (first) cancer operation.
I came to talk to Feynman regularly, more or less once a month, during my Tolman
Fellowship at Caltech (which started in the Fall of 1981), and a bit less often for a few
years afterwards. I have also sat occasionally in the class on physics and computation he
taught with John Hopfield. And I remember discussing with him (among other subjects)
the connection between physics, information and computation. In fact, this was a recur-
ring theme. For me, it became somewhat of an obsession early on — I really liked the
universality of Turing machines, the halting problem, and the algorithmic view of informa-
tion. While I was in Austin the fascination with these ideas and their possible relevance
for physics was reinforced under the influence of John Wheeler. Which brings me, at long
last, to the algorithmic information content, measurements, and various thermodynamic
demons which probe the utility of acquired information.
Maxwell’s demon — a hypothetical intelligent entity capable of performing measure-
ments on a thermodynamic system and using their outcomes to extract useful work —
was considered a threat to the validity of the second law of thermodynamics for over a
century.2,3 Feynman was fascinated with the subject, and his discussion of ratchet and
pawl1 banished forever the “unintelligent” trapdoor version of the demon by clarifying
and updating the influential argument put forward by Smoluchowski4 much earlier, and
in a rather different setting.* However, Smoluchowski’s trapdoor carries out no (explicit)
measurements. Therefore, trapdoors and ratchets and pawls can be analysed without
reference to information.1,4
The complete Maxwell’s demon should be able to measure, and it (...?; he? she?!)
should be of course intelligent. Smoluchowski’s trapdoor does not fit this bill. Measure-
ments were incorporated into the discussion by Szilard6, Landauer7, and Bennett8 who
have argued, in a setting involving ensembles of demons, that the acquisition of infor-
* Smoluchowski’s original trapdoor was a hole surrounded by hairs combed so that they
all come out on the same side of the partition between the two chambers (rather than a real
trapdoor). Naively, this arrangement of hairs should favor molecules passing in the direc-
tion in which the hair is combed, and impede the reverse motion. Smoluchowski pointed
out that thermal fluctuations will “ruffle the hair” and make this arrangement ineffective
as a rectifier of fluctuations when the whole system is at the same fixed temperature.
Numerical simulations of trapdoors confirm these conclusions5. They also show why our
intuition based on far-from-equilibrium behavior of trapdoors can be easily misled.
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mation is only possible when the demon’s memory is repeatedly erased, to prepare it for
the new data. The cost of erasure eventually offsets whatever thermodynamic advan-
tages of the demon’s information gain might offer. This point (which has come to be
known as “Landauer’s principle”) is now widely recognised as a key ingredient of ther-
modynamic demonology. This originally classical reasoning has been since extended to
quantum physics9,10, and may even be experimentally testable.11
However, the widespread fascination with Maxwell’s demon is ultimately due to its
intelligence. A demon will record a specific outcome of the measurement, and — using
its intelligence — will try to make an optimal decision about the best possible action,
which would maximize the work extracted from a given recorded phase space configuration.
This is very much the course of action we take (although, fortunately for us, in a far-
from-equilibrium setting). How can one convince an intelligent demon that, all cleverness
notwithstanding, its attempts at defeating the second law are doomed? This is hard to
accomplish at the level of ensembles: Each demon knows nothing but its own record, and
need not care about the other members of “its ensemble” that have found out something
else in their measurements — it will find out solution to its own problem.
The ultimate analysis of Maxwell’s demon must involve a definition of intelligence,
a characteristic which has been all too consistently banished from discussions of demons
carried out by physicists. On the other hand, intelligence has been — since Turing and
his famous test — often invoked in the discussions of computer scientists. To convince
ourselves (and the intelligent demon) of the limits imposed by the second law we shall,
following Ref. 12, adopt an operational definition of intelligence which arose in the context
of the theory of computation. It is based on the so-called Church–Turing thesis13 — which
in effect formalizes Turing’s expectations about the “mental” capabilities of computers and
states that intelligence is equivalent to the same kind of information processing that is in
principle implementable on a universal computer.
Using the Church–Turing thesis as a point of departure, the present author has demon-
strated that even this intelligent threat to the second law can be eliminated — the original
“smart” Maxwell’s demon can be exorcized. This is easiest to establish when one recog-
nizes that the net ability of demons to extract useful work from systems depends on the
sum of measures of two distinct aspects of disorder:12
(i) The usual statistical entropy given by:
H(ρ) = −Trρ lg ρ (1)
where ρ is the density matrix of the system, determines the ignorance of the observer.
(ii) The algorithmic information content:14−20
K(ρ) = |p∗ρ| (2)
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is given by the size (“|...|”), in bits, of the shortest algorithm (p∗) which, for an “operating
system” of a given Maxwell’s demon, can reproduce the detailed description (ρ) of the state
of the system. K(ρ) quantifies the cost of storing of the acquired information, which is
related to the randomness inherent in the state of the system revealed by the measurement.
The Church–Turing thesis enters in this second algorithmic ingredient, as it involves an
assumption that the intellectual abilities of Maxwell’s demons can be regarded as equiv-
alent to those of a universal Turing machine: It is assumed that demons can execute
programs (such as p∗ρ) to reconstruct records of past measurements out of their optimally
compressed versions, or to carry out other logical operations in optimizing performance.
Algorithmic information content provides a well-defined measure of the storage space re-
quired to register the known characteristics of the system.
Physical entropy12 is the sum of the statistical entropy and of the algorithmic infor-
mation content:
Z(ρ) = H(ρ) +K(ρ) (3)
Above, it is assumed that the base for the logarithm in Eq. (1) is the same as the size of the
alphabet used by the computer which constitutes the operating system of the Maxwell’s
demon. In practice, it is customary and convenient to employ a binary alphabet, so that
both H(ρ) and K(ρ) are measured in bits.
In order to appreciate the physical significance of the algorithmic randomness contri-
bution, it is useful to discuss the behavior of H, K and Z in the course of measurements
and to follow the operations of the engines controlled by demons. In short, the two mea-
sures turn out to be complementary — not in the quantum sense, but a bit like kinetic
and potential energy — and their sum is, on the average, conserved under optimal mea-
surements carried out on an equilibrium ensemble. Analysis which leads to this conclusion
was carried out by this author12,10 and extended by Caves21. Below we offer only a brief
summary of the salient points.
In the course of ideal measurement on an equilibrium ensemble the decrease of ig-
norance is, on the average, compensated for by the increase of the size of the minimal
record:12
∆H ≃ − < ∆K > . (4)
Consequently, physical entropy Z plays a role analogous to a constant of motion. The
transformation of the state of the system is now, however, brought about by a demon-
ical (rather than dynamical) evolution, by the act of acquisition of information. This
“conservation law” can be demonstrated within the context of the algorithmic theory of
information.12,10,21,22 However, its validity can be traced to coding theory:12,21−23 Ac-
cording to the noiseless coding theorem of Shannon,23 the minimal size L of the message
required to encode information which corresponds to a decrease of entropy by ∆H is, on
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the average over all of the messages, bounded by:
∆H ≤ L < ∆H + 1
This inequality is used in the proof of Eq. (4) and is ultimately responsible for the con-
stancy of the physical entropy Z in the course of the measurement.12,21
The role of Z in determining the efficiency of demon-operated engines is the ultimate
reason for regarding Z as physical entropy. For, the total amount of work which can be
extracted from a physical system in contact with a heat reservoir of temperature T in
the course of a cycle which involves a measurement (ρ → ρi) and isothermal expansion
(ρi → ρ) can be made as large as, but no larger than:
∆W = kBT (Z(ρ)−Z(ρi)) (5)
To justify this last assertion, I shall appeal to Landauer’s principle7 which formalizes
earlier remarks of Szilard6 and states that erasure of one bit of information from the
memory carries a thermodynamic price of kBT . Although Landauer’s principle assigns
a definite price to the storage of information, this price need not be paid right away: a
demon with a large unused memory can continue to carry out measurements as long as
it has room to store information. However, such a demon poses no threat to the second
law: its operation is not truly cyclic. In effect, it operates by employing its initially empty
memory as a low temperature (zero entropy) heat sink.
Erasure of the results of used up measurements carries a price tag of
∆W− = T < (K(ρi)−K(ρ) > , (6a)
which must be subtracted from the gain of useful work
∆W+ = T (H(ρ)−H(ρi)) , (6b)
to obtain the net work extracted by the demon. This immediately justifies Eq. (5). The
hybrid Z is the physical entropy which provides the demon with an individual, personal
measure of the potential for thermodynamic gains due to the information in its possession.
It also demonstrates that a demon operating on a system in thermodynamic equilibrium
will never be able to threaten the second law, for the ensemble average of Z is at best
conserved, so that < ∆Z >≤ 0 in course of the process of acquisition of information.
This last assertion is, however, justified only if the demon is forced to complete each
measurement-initiated cycle. One can, by contrast, imagine a demon of choice, an intelli-
gent and selective version of Maxwell’s demon, who carries out to completion only those
cycles for which the initial state of the system is sufficiently nonrandom (concisely describ-
able, or algorithmically simple) to allow for a brief compressed record (small K(ρ)). This
6
strategy appears to allow the demon to extract a sizeable work (∆W+) at a small expense
(∆W−). Moreover, if the measurements can be reversibly undone, then the ones with dis-
appointing outcomes could be reversed at no cost. Such demons would still thereaten the
second law, even if the threat is somewhat more subtle than in the case of Smoluchowski’s
trapdoor.
Caves22 has considered and partially exorcised such a demon of choice by demonstrat-
ing that in any case the net gain of work cannot exceed kBT per measurement. Thus,
the demons would be, at best, limited to exploiting thermal fluctuations. Moreover, in
a comment24 on Ref. 22 it was noted that taking advantage of such fluctuations is not
really possible. Here I shall demonstrate that the only decision making process free of
inconsistencies necessarily leaves in the observer’s (demon’s) memory a “residue” which
requires eventual erasure. The least cost of erasure of this residue is just enough to restore
the validity of the second law. The aim of this paper is to make this argument (first put
forward by this author at the meeting of the Complexity, Entropy, and the Physics of
Computation network of the Santa Fe Institute in April of 1990) more carefully and more
precisely.
To focus on a specific example consider a Gabor’s engine25 illustrated in Fig. 1. There,
the unlikely but profitable fluctuation occurs whenever the gas molecule is found in the
small compartment of the engine. The amount of extractable work is:
∆W+p = kBT lg(L/ℓ) (7)
The expense (measured by the used up memory) is only:
∆W− = kBT, (8)
so that the net gain of work per each successful cycle is:
∆Wp = kBT (lg(L/ℓ)− 1) (9)
The more likely “uneconomical” cycles would allow a gain of work:
∆W+u = kBT lgL/(L− ℓ) , (10)
so that the cost of memory erasure (still given by Eq. (8)) outweighs the profit, leaving
the net gain of work:
∆Wu = −kBT (1− lgL/(L− ℓ)). (11)
When each measurement is followed by the extraction and erasure routine, the averaged
net work gain per cycle is negative (i.e., it becomes a loss):
< ∆W >=
ℓ
L
∆Wp +
L− ℓ
L
∆Wu = −kBT [1 + (
ℓ
L
lg
ℓ
L
+
L− ℓ
L
lg
L− ℓ
L
)] (12)
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The break even point occurs for the case of Szilard’s engine6, where the partition divides the
container in half. In the opposite limit, ℓ/L << 1, almost every measurement leads to an
unsuccessful case which results in a negligible amount of extracted work but undiminished
cost of erasure per cycle.
The design of the demon of choice attempts to capitalize on precisely this otherwise
unprofitable limit by undoing all of the likely (and unprofitable) measurements at no
thermodynamic cost, thus avoiding the necessity for erasure of the unused outcomes. It
is important to emphasize that a measurement of the thermodynamic quantities can be
indeed undone at no cost: A prejudice that measurement must be thermodynamically
expensive goes back at least to the ambiguities in the original paper of Szilard6 (who has
hinted at, but failed to clearly identify erasure as the only thermodynamically expensive
part of the measuring process), and was further reinforced by the popular (but incorrect)
discussion of Brillouin.26 Figure 2 demonstrates how to carry out a measurement on a
particle in the Gabor’s engine (such measurement becomes reversible when the operations
indicated are carried out infinitezimally slowly).
The purpose of the measurement is to establish a correlation between the state of the
system and the record — the state of the few relevant bits of memory. In the context of this
paper we shall focus on the measurements which correlate memory with a cell in the phase
space or a subspace of the Hilbert space of the system (corresponding to the projection
operator Pi). In concert with the usual requirements I shall demand that the collection {Pi}
of all the measurements be mutually exclusive (Tr(Pi, Pj) = 0), and exhaustive (ΣiPi = 1).
To avoid problems associated with quantum measurements we shall also demand that the
measured observables should commute with the density matrix of the measured system
[Pi, ρS] = 0. Thus, we shall allow for the best case
9 (from the demon’s point of view),
with no additional thermodynamic inefficiencies associated with the reduction of the state
vector introduced into quantum measurement through decoherence.28−31,10,11
A measurement performed by the demon, when viewed from the outside, results in
the correlation between the state of the system (i.e. location of the particle in the Gabor’s
engine) and the state of the demon’s memory. The total entropy can be prevented from
increasing, as the only requirement for a successful measurement is to convert initial density
matrix of the combined system-demon:
ρ
(o)
SD = ρS × ρ
(o)
D = (ΣipiPi)× ρ
(o)
D (13a)
into the correlated9,10,28−31:
ρSD = Σipi(Pi × ρ
(i)
D ) (13b)
Above, we have implicitly assumed that the measurement is exhaustive in the sense that
the further refinements will reveal uniform probability distribution within the partitions
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defined by Pi. This need not be the case — it is straightforward to generalize the above
formulae to the case when the different memory states of the demon are correlated with
density matrices of the system. In any case, the entropies of ρ
(i)
D and ρ
(o)
D can, in principle,
be the same: For, there exists a unitary controlled-not - like evolution operator:
U = ΣiPi × (|δi >< δo|+ |δo >< δi|) (14)
with |δi > and |δo > defined by ρ
(i)
D = |δi >< δo|ρ
(o)
D , providing that ρ
(i)
D correspond to
distinguishable (orthogonal) memory states of the demon — a natural requirement for a
successful measurement.
The statistical entropy of the system-demon combination is obviously the same be-
fore and after measurement, as, by construction of U , H(ρ
(i)
D ) = H(ρ
(o)
D ). Moreover, the
measurement is obviously reversible: Applying the unitary evolution operator, Eq. (14),
twice, will restore the pre-measurement situation.
From the viewpoint of the outside observer, the measurement leads to a correlation
between the system and the memory of the demon: The ensemble averaged increase of the
ignorance about the content of demon’s memory;
∆HD = H(ρD)−H(ρ
(o)
D ) = −Σipi lg pi , (15)
(where ρD = TrSρSD and H(ρ) = −Trρ lg ρ) is compensated for by the increase of the
mutual information defined as;
ISD = H(ρD) +H(ρS)−H(ρSD), (16)
so that ∆HD = ∆ISD (see Refs. 29 and 33 for the Shannon and algorithmic versions of
this discussion in somewhat different settings).
From the viewpoint of the demon the acquired data are definite: The outcome is some
definite demon state ρ
(n)
D corresponding to the memory state n, and associated with the
most concise record — increase of the algorithmic information content — given by some
∆K(n) = K(ρ
(n)
S )−K(ρ
(o)
S ).
The demon of choice would now either; (i) proceed with the expansion, extraction and
erasure, providing that his estimate of the future gain:
∆W = kBT (∆H −∆K) = kBT∆Z (17)
was positive, or, alternatively; (ii) undo the measurement at no cost, providing that ∆W <
0. An algorithm that attempts to implement this strategy for the case of Gabor’s engine
is illustrated in Fig. 3. To see why this strategy will not work, we first note that the
demon of choice threatens the second law only if its operation is cyclic — that is, it must
be possible to implement the algorithm without it coming to an inevitable halt.
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There is no need to comment on the left-hand side part of the cycle: it starts with
the insertion of the partition. Detection of a particle in the left-hand side compartment
is followed by the expansion of the partition (converted into a piston) and results in ex-
traction of ∆W+p , Eq. (7), of work. Since the partition was extracted, the results of the
measurement must be erased (to prepare for the next measurement) which costs kBT of
useful work, so that the gain per useful cycle is given by Eq. (9). The partition can be
now reinserted and the whole cycle can start again.
There is, however, no decision procedure which can implement the goal of the right-
hand side of the tree. The measurement can be of course undone. The demon — after
undoing the correlation — no longer knows the location of the molecule inside the engine.
Unfortunately for the demon, this does not imply that the state of the engine has also been
undone. Moreover, the demon with empty memory will immediately proceed to do what
demons with empty memory always do: It will measure. This action is an “unconditional
reflex” of a demon with an empty memory. It is inevitable, as the actions of the demon
must be completely determined by its internal state, including the state of its memory.
(This is the same rule as for Turing machines.) But the particle in the Gabor’s engine is
still stuck on the unprofitable side of the partition. Therefore, when the measurement is
repeated, it will yield the same disappointing result as before, and the demon will be locked
forever into the measure - unmeasure “two-step” within the same unprofitable branch of
the cycle by its algorithm, which compels it to repeat two controlled-not like actions, Eq.
(14), which jointly amount to an identity.
This vicious cycle could be interrupted only if the decision process called for extraction
and reinsertion of the partition before undoing the measurement (and thus causing the
inevitable immediate re-measurement) in the unprofitable right branch of the decision
tree. Extraction of the partition before the measurement is undone increases the entropy
of the gas by kB [lg(L− ℓ)/L] and destroys the correlation with the demon’s memory, thus
decreasing the mutual information: The molecule now occupies the whole volume of the
engine. Moreover it occurs with no gain of useful work. Consequently, reversibly undoing
the measurement after the partition is extracted is no longer possible: The location on
the decision tree (extracted partition, “full” memory) implicitly demonstrates that the
measurement has been carried out and that it has revealed that the molecule was in the
unprofitable compartment — it can occurr only in the right hand branch of the tree.
The opening of the partition has resulted in a free expansion of the gas, which squan-
dered away the correlation between the state of the gas and the state of the memory of the
demon. Absence of the correlation eliminates the possibility of undoing the measurement.
Thus, now erasure is the only remaining option. It would have to be carried out before
the next measurement, and the price of kBT per bit would have to be paid.
6,7
One additional strategy should be explored before we conclude this discussion: The
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demon of choice can be assumed to have a large memory tape, so that it can put off
erasures and temporarily store the results of its N measurements. The tape would then
contain ∼ N · (ℓ− L)/L 0’s (which we shall take to signify an unprofitable outcome) and
∼ N ℓ/L 1’s. In the limit of large N (N ℓ/L >> 1) the algorithmic information content of
such a “sparse” binary sequence s is given by14−20:
K(s) ≃ −N [
ℓ
L
lg
ℓ
L
+
L− ℓ
L
lg
L− ℓ
L
] (18)
Moreover, a binary string can be, at least in principle, compressed to its minimal record
(s∗ such that K(s) = |s∗|) by a reversible computation.12 Hence, it is possible to erase the
record of the measurements carried out by the demon at a cost of no less than
< ∆W− >= kBT [K(s)/N ] . (19)
Thus, if the erasure is delayed so that the demon can attempt to minimize its cost before
carrying it out, it can at best break even: The −kBT in Eq. (12) is substituted by the
< ∆W− >, Eq. (19), which yields:
< ∆W >=< ∆W+ > + < ∆W− >= 0. (20)
It is straightforward to generalize this lesson derived on the example of Gabor’s en-
gine to other situations. The essential ingredient is the “noncommutativity” of the two
operations: “undo the measurement” can be reversibly carried out only before “extract
the partition.” The actions of the demon are, by the assumption of Church–Turing the-
sis, completely determined by its internal state, especially its memory content. Demons
are forced to make useless re-measurements. Famous Santayana’s saying those who forget
their history are doomed to relive it applies to demons with a vengance! For, when the
demon forgets the measurement outcome, it will repeat the measurement and remain stuck
forever in the unprofitable cycle. One could consider more complicated algorithms, with
additional bits and instructions on when to measure, and so on. The point is, however,
that all such strategies must ultimately contain explicit or implicit information about the
branch on which the demon has found itself as a result of the measurement. Erasure of this
information carries a price which is on the average no less than the “illicit” gains which
would violate the second law.
The aim of this paper was to exorcise the demon of choice — a selective version of
Maxwell’s demon which attempted to capitalize on large thermal fluctuations by reversibly
undoing all of the measurements which did not reveal the system to be sufficiently far from
equilibrium. I have demonstrated that a deterministic version of such a demon fails, as no
decision procedure is capable of both (i) reversibly undoing the measurement, and, also, of
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(ii) opening the partitions inserted prior to the measurement to allow for energy extraction
following readoff of the outcome.
Our discussion was phrased — save for an occassional reference to density matrices,
Hilbert spaces, etc. — in a noncommital language, and it is indeed equally applicable in
the classical and quantum contexts. As was pointed out already some time ago9,10, the
only difference arises in the course of measurements. Quantum measurements are typically
accompanied by a “reduction of the state vector”. It ocurrs whenever observer measures
observables that are not co-diagonal with the density matrix of the system. It is a (near)
instantaneous process34, which is nowadays understood as a consequence of decoherence
and einselection28−34. The implications of this difference are minor from the viewpoint of
the threat to the second law posed by the demons (although decoherence is paramount
for the discussion of the interpretation of quantum theory). It was noted already some
time ago that decoherence (or, more generally, the increase of entropy associated with the
reduction of the state vector) is not necessary to save the second law9. Soon after the
algorithmic information content entered the discussion of demons12,21 it was also realised
that the additional cost decoherence represents can be conveniently quantified using the
“deficit” in what this author knew then as the ‘Gronewald–Lindblad inequality’35,36, and
what is now more often (and equally justifiably) called the ‘Holevo quantity;37
χ = H(ρ)−
∑
i
piH(ρ
(i)
S ) , (21)
which is a measure of the entropy increase due to the “reduction”. The two proofs36,37 in-
volving essentially the same quantity have appeared almost simultaneously, independently,
and were motivated by — at least superficially — quite different considerations.
We shall not repeat these discussions here in detail. There are however several inde-
pendently sufficient reasons not to worry about decoherence in the demonic context which
deserve a brief review. To begin with, decoherence cannot help the demon as it only
adds to the “cost of doing business”. And the second law is apparently safe even without
decoherence9. Moreover, especially in the context of Szilard’s or Gabor’s engines, decoher-
ence is unlikely to hurt the demon either, since the obvious projection operators to use in
Eq. (14) correspond to the particle being on the left (right) of the partition, and are likely
to diagonalise the density matrix of the system in contact with a typical environment9 (heat
bath). (Superpositions of states corresponding to such obvious measurement outcomes are
very Schro¨dinger cat – like, and, therefore, unstable on the decoherence timescale34.) Last
not least, even if demon for some odd reason started by measuring some observable which
does not commute with the density matrix of the system decohering in contact with the
heat bath environment, it should be able to figure out what’s wrong and learn after a while
what to measure to minimise the cost of erasure (demons are supposed to be intelligent,
after all!).
12
So decoherence is of secondary importance in assuring validity of the second law
in the setting involving engines and demons: Entropy cannot decrease already without
it! But decoherence can (and often will) add to the measurement costs, and the cost of
decoherence is paid “up front”, during the measurement (and not really during the erasure,
although there may be an ambiguity there — see a quantum calculation of erasure – like
process of the consequences of decoherence in Ref. 38). Moreover, in the context of
dynamics decoherence is the ultimate cause of entropy production, and, thus, the cause
of the algorithmic arrow of time33. Moreover, there are intriguing quantum implication of
the interplay of decoherence and (algorithmic) information that follow: Discussions of the
interpretational issues of quantum theory are often conducted in a way which implicitly
separates the information observers have about the state of the systems in the “rest of the
Universe” from their own physical state — their identity. Yet, as the above analysis of the
observer-like demons demonstrates, there can be no information without representation.
The observer’s state (or, for that matter, the state of its memory) determines its actions
and should be regarded as an ultimate description of its identity. So, to end with one more
“deep truth” existence (of the observers state, and, especially, of the state of its memory)
precedes the essence (observer’s information, and, hence their future actions).
I have benefited from discussion on this subject with many, including Andreas Al-
brecht, Charles Bennett, Carlton Caves, Murray Gell-Mann, Chris Jarzynski, Demon
Laflamme (who contributed to lowering entropy of the manuscript), Rolf Landauer, Seth
Lloyd, Michael Nielsen, Bill Unruh, and John Wheeler, who, in addition to stimulating
the initial interest in matters concerning physics and information, insisted on my monthly
dialogues with Feynman. This has led to one more “adventure with a curious character”:
In the Spring of 1984 I participated in the “Quantum Noise” program at the Institute for
Theoretical Physics, UC Santa Barbara. It was to end with a one-week conference on var-
ious relevant quantum topics. One of the organisers (I think it was Tony Leggett), aware
of my monthly escapades to Caltech, and of Feynman’s (and mine) interests in quantum
computation asked me whether I could ask him to speak. I did, and Feynman immediately
agreed.
The lectures were held in a large conference room at the campus of the University of
California at Santa Barbara. For the “regular speakers” and for most of the talks (such
as my discussion of the decoherence timescale which was eventually published as Ref. 34)
the room was filled to perhaps a third of the capacity. However, when I walked in in the
middle of the afternoon coffee break, well in advance of Feynman’s talk, the room was
already nearly full, and the air was thick with anticipation. A moment after I sat down in
one of the few empty seats, I saw Feynman come in, and quietly take a seat somewhere in
the midst of the audience. More people came in, including the organisers and the session
chairman. The scheduled time of his talk came... and went. It was five minutes after. Ten
13
minutes. Quarter of an hour. The chairman was nervous. I did not understand what was
going on — I clearly saw Feynman’s long grey hair and an occasional flash of an impish
smile a few rows ahead.
Then it struck me: He was just being “a curious character”, curious about what will
happen... He did what he had promised — showed up for his talk on (or even before) time,
and now he was going to see how the events unfold.
In the end I did the responsible thing: After a few more minutes I pointed out the
speaker to the session chairman (who was greatly relieved, and who immediately and
reverently led him to the speaker’s podium). The talk (with the content, more or less, of
Ref. 39) started only moderately behind the schedule. And I was immediately sorry that
I did not play along a while longer — I felt as if I had given away a high-school prank
before it was fully consummated!
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Figure Captions:
Fig. 1 Gabor’s engine.25. See text for the standard operating procedure. The decision
between the two branches (of which only one — the profitable one — is shown) can be
made reversibly with the help of the device shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2 Blueprint of a reversible measuring device for Gabor’s engine. The measurements
can be done (or undone) by turning the crank on the right in the appropriate direction
and pushing in or pulling out the “scale”. Thermodynamic reversibility is achieved in the
limit of an infinitesimally slow operation. Faster controlled-not like measurements can be
carried out on a dynamical timescale by implementing the unitary evolution given by Eq.
(14). The design shown above is similar to the Szilard’s engine contraption devised in Ref.
28.
Fig. 3 Decision flowchart for the demon of choice. The branch on the left is profitable
(and it is followed when the particle is “caught” in the small left chamber, see Fig. 1).
The branch on the right is unprofitable, and as it is explained in the text in more detail,
the demon of choice cannot be “saved” by reversing only the unprofitable measurements.
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